Essay on sexual morality

SEXUAL MORALITY

Sex – even in the liberal 21st century, talking about sexual activities still is a taboo subject in most societies. We teach our children not to evoke the subject, we are anxious about the day the questions are going to fall: how are babies made? What are mommy and daddy doing in the bedroom?, although we are expected to be informed about the subject. We emit judgments on people about their sexual activities, judgments which are usually based on our own education; this is why some older people still do not consider homosexuality morally acceptable, since their education taught them to think that way. We condemn certain kinds of sexual activities while we tolerate others, evoking morality. This raises the question about sexual morality, e.g. where is the limit between an acceptable sexual act and a sexual perversion. And by calling a sexual act ‘perverted sex’, do we necessarily label it as morally wrong? Do we make any difference? By considering the use of the term ‘perversion’ in other contexts and some philosophical analysis of sexual morality, I will try to define ‘sexual perversion’ and determine if it includes a moral judgment or definition.

It is only in the late 20th century that the philosophy of sex became a legitimate research domain. Although the first thoughts about human sexuality go back to Plato and ‘the good life of reason’, the sexual liberation of the 1960’s and the feminist movement made philosophers rethink the question and the topic earned his scientific value in the newly liberalised society. There have been two main evaluation of sexual activity, which I will not elaborate further: on the one hand, Immanuel Kant’s negative understanding of sexuality, defining the sexual desire as a subconscious appetite for an object of desire, namely the loved one. He thus promotes the sexual celibacy as being the better moral life. Right away, the word ‘moral’ here falls: indeed Kant sees sexuality outside its reproduction ‘function’ as morally wrong . On the other hand we have a more positive evaluation understanding sexual activity as a mutual pleasure giving act.

Alan H. Goldman is one of the early thinker in this newly born domain. He assumes that sexual desire or activity arouses physical contact with another human being’s body and the resulting pleasure; sex is only about pleasure . He reject the ‘means-end analysis’ which represents sexual activity as a mean to a specific end.

He objects that sex without a specific purpose is not necessarily a perverted act. Goldman thus defends a rather liberal view of sexual activity, pleasure and, by extension, morality. On this point I agree with this paper. Sex is, as Goldman points out, not a ‘means to an end’ act, since this would rule out all casual sex which is obviously predominant in today’s societies.

Goldman supports his opinion on the ‘means-end analysis’ by going through different supposed ends. To the Procreation Theory which says that the only purpose of genital intercourse is reproduction and every other sexual act is perverted and thus morally wrong, Goldman responds that reproduction might be the natural purpose of sex, but not the human one; here I do have my troubles acknowledging what is being said. In that theory, sex is the mean to reproduction. However, casual sex and every sexual act condemned by the theory are natural as well, since there is no human behaviour outside of nature . In my opinion, separating that drastically natural from human concerns is too farfetched. Reproduction is and stays the initial goal of sex, humans just perform it outside that framework.

Goldman considers two different ethical ways of acting and judging in relation to the sexual act. On the one hand, he adopts a utilitarian theory by saying that the moral judgment of a sexual act is determined by how much pleasure or happiness it produces for both actors. Without involving any feelings, an act can be fulfilling and morally right. The way I understand Goldman’s point here, the rightness of a sexual act would depend on the resulting pleasure. In that sense, not one traditionally considered sexual perversion would be considered perverted, however it is common sense when I say that paedophilia, for instance, is perverted. Goldman’s point here is too exclusive. On the other hand the philosopher applies the Kantian Categorical Imperative and supposes that, as long as both actors fully consent to the sexual act, the act is morally acceptable. If we follow this reasoning, we would consider as morally wrong and perverted only rape, necrophilia, zoophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism and maybe even fetishism (If we take as source the list of previously considered sexual perversions and exclude masturbation since there is only one person involved). This might fit the common sense of sexual perversion, although the morality of the rest of the list still seems unstable.

So far, sexual perversion seems to be a sexual act that lacks mutual felt pleasure and thus mutual consent. However, a range of sexual acts provide pleasure to both consenting actors and still do not seem to gain a moral value. That definition leaves out too many sexual perversions. Furthermore, Goldman does not question the moral value of the term ‘perversion’. I think that it is necessary to regard the understanding of the term in other contexts. One defines ‘perversion’ as the ‘distortion or corruption of the original course, meaning or state of something’, this

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