Euroscepticism within the Conservative Party

The rise of Euroscepticism within the Conservative party and its impacts

        To begin with it is crucial to remind what Euroscepticism means; originally, Euroscepticism is the opposition to UK's adherence to first the European Community and then the European Union. After the United Kingdom ratified the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s, Euroscepticism is characterised by a desire to leave the European Union. As this essay focuses mainly on the rise of Euroscepticism since 1992, this last definition will be used. (Agnès Alexandre-Collier, 2017, p.4) Historically, when the European project was still in its infancy, the Conservative Party was the one clearly in favour of the United Kingdom joining the European Community whereas the Labour Party was divided on this topic. Indeed, Harold MacMillan - Conservative Prime Minister - first applied to join the European Common Market; this application was finally rejected due to the French President’s veto - de Gaulle. Following a new application rejected in 1967, Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath finally signed the Accession Treaty in 1972 (BBC, 1973) before it was approved by Parliament through the European Communities Act. Two other proofs that the Conservative Party was historically Europhile are the pro-European campaign of 1975 while the Labour Party - divided on the European question - held a referendum on whether the UK should remain within the European community and Thatcher's signature a decade later of the Single European Act aiming at establishing a European single market by 1992 (Toby Helm, 2016). However, Margaret Thatcher's 1988 Bruges speech marks a turning point within the party and paves the way for Euroscepticism. Despite this discourse, the Eurosceptic rebels were only a residual part of the Conservative Party at the time of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. Thus, how can it be explained that it was the Conservative Party that proposed holding a referendum in 2013 to determine whether the United Kingdom should remain in the European Union? Therefore, a paradox appears concerning the conservative party: it is the party that allowed both adherence to the European project and the holding of a referendum leading to Brexit. This paradox leads to the following questions: How did Euroscepticism rise within the Conservative party and what are the impacts of this phenomenon on the party itself?

        The purpose of this essay will be to explain the rise of Euroscepticism since 1992 within the Conservative Party before proving that this rise of Euroscepticism had a strong influence on the holding of an in-out referendum and had a huge impact on the party itself. To do so, this essay will tend to show the strong links between Thatcherism and the rise of Euroscepticism since 1992 before presenting the significant structural changes within the Conservative Party which led to the increasing role of Euroscepticism within the party. Finally, this essay will discuss the important repercussions that had the rise of Euroscepticism.

        First of all, to understand the rise of conservative Euroscepticism since 1992, it is necessary to know where it comes from. Conservative Euroscepticism seems to have a direct relationship with Thatcherism embodied in the Bruges speech delivered by Margaret Thatcher - then Prime Minister - on 20 September 1988 (Agnès Alexandre-Collier, 2002, p.58-62). And for good reason, the term 'Euroscepticism' was created following this speech (Philippe Perchoc, 2012, p.146). In this discourse, Thatcherism is characterized first and foremost by the defence of economic neo-liberalism (Agnès Alexandre-Collier, 2002, p.58-62). Thus, Margaret Thatcher advocates deregulation, the free movement of capital, a free market in banking and financial services, flexibility of labour rather than the security demanded by Jacques Delors - then President of the European Commission - a few weeks earlier (Margaret Thatcher, 1988, p.6-7). Moreover, Thatcherism is constituted by the original substance of conservatism, which is characterized by the defence of national sovereignty - or independence - by promoting national primacy (Agnès Alexandre-Collier, 2002, p.58-62) and by the criticism of a federalist drift of Europe as desired by Jacques Delors (Philippe Perchoc, 2012, p.130).  Thatcher seeks to defend the primacy and national sovereignty by not opening the borders of her country; she thought the United Kingdom ‘cannot totally abolish frontier controls if we are also to protect our citizens from crime and stop the movement of drugs, of terrorists and of illegal immigrants’ (Margaret Thatcher, 1988, p.6). Her European thinking thus resumed her political thinking: an alliance of economic liberalism and patriotism combined with societal conservatism. A Europe of States united around the free market without abolishing physical borders. It is precisely in this criticism of the disappearance of borders that its legacy seems to be strongest at the European level: the argument of national sovereignty being one of the most fiercely put forward by Brexit's defenders during the 2016 referendum campaign.

        But to show the direct relationship between Thatcherism and Euroscepticism emerging at the beginning of the 1990s, it is necessary to compare the typology of conservative voters drawn up by Norton with the list of Eurosceptic rebels of 1992 who opposed accession to the European Union. Of the 41 MPs who voted against the Maastricht Treaty, by referring to Norton’s typology, 14 of them are considered as ‘Thatcherites’ and 5 of them ‘Thatcher Loyalists’ - MPs attached to Thatcher's government style (Philip Norton, 1990, p.41-58). Thus, among the 41 opponents of Europe in 1992, 19 of them are members of parliament who support Thatcher's vision of Europe. Although the Thatcherite Eurosceptics do not represent the majority of Eurosceptic MPs, Thatcherite Euroscepticism was already well anchored in Conservative Euroscepticism and will take an even more important place in the party when William Hague became party leader.  

        Indeed, after the defeat of the party - then led by the Europhile John Major - in the 1997 general elections, William Hague, a loyal supporter of Margaret Thatcher and a convinced Eurosceptic, took over as leader of the party. William Hague quickly showed his fervent opposition to Europe - in particular to the single currency (Hague, William, 1997, Britain and the single currency) - and his Thatcherite vision of Europe through his Budapest speech, which eminently recalled the Bruges speech. Moreover, Thatcher herself dubbed William Hague in 1997: ‘he stands for the things I believe in […] Britain as a free, sovereign nation with control over its own affairs’ (Alexandre- Collier, 2002 cited Margaret Thatcher’s interview in The Guardian, 12th June 1997) (Agnès Alexandre-Collier, 2002, p.65-67). The former Prime Minister could only acknowledge their filiation after Hague stated in his 1999 speech that the UK was 'in Europe but not run by Europe' (William Hague, 1999) and reaffirmed deeply Thatcherite principles such as economic liberalism and national independence (Agnès Alexandre-Collier, 2002, p.65-67).

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